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RICH AND POOR COUNTRIES AND THE LIMITS 
OF IDEOLOGY- AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE DAY'S PROCEEDINGS 
L. F. E. GOLDIE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This is the eighth annual Regional Meeting of the American Society 
of International Law here at Syracuse. Our topic for this meeting is 
"The United Nations and the Resources of the Deep-Ocean Floor." 
The problems which this theme signals are becoming acute as the 
world's population increasingly presses on our diminishing resources 
and as our environment is threatened with major and possibly 
irreversible degradation. 
II. THE INTERFACE OF THE REGIME OF THE CONTINENTAL 
SHELF AND THAT OF THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR 
A. The Ou_ter Limits of the Contjnental Shelf 
We are faced now, some say, with the possibility of a kind of 
"Oklahoma Land Rush" into the deep ocean floor, or a new phase of 
colonialism similar to the nineteenth-century "Grab for Africa." There 
are, however, those who argue that while we may be faced with a great 
deal of talk about the possibility of an "Oklahoma Land Rush," there is 
none of the reality. The truth, as always, is somewhere between these 
extremes. The open-endedness of the definitions for demarcating the 
outer limits of the continental shelf region over which coastal states 
may exercise specialized sovereign rights under the 1958 Continental 
Shelf Convention provides possible conditions for territorial 
imperatives and cartographical chauvinism dominating the future 
exploration and exploitation of the seabed. When the participants in the 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva from 
February 24th to April 27th, 1958, discussed the Continental Shelf 
Doctrine they, following the International Law Commission and 
experts whom the International Law Commission had consulted, felt 
that there was safety in prescribing a fixed isobath as the outer limit to 
the continental shelf, namely 200 meters, or 100 fathoms. This was seen 
as the outer limit not only in a legal sense, but also in a practical sense, 
since most of the delegates considered that technology would not permit 
exploitation further out than that bathymetric contour line for many 
years to come. This was not however, the only point of view, as 
the International Law Commission's 1951 Draft Article 1 illustrates. 
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There were optimists (or rather realists) who, throughout the decade, 
had said that technology would shortly permit the exploitation of the 
seabed beyond the fixed maximum depth of 200 meters. One may note 
that in 1958 the maxim um depth of economic exploitation where oil was 
being won was approximately 30 fathoms. Hence, they argued, the law, 
in order to be flexible, required a supplementary and contingent 
criterion which would enable · the law to govern relations when 
technology permitted seabed mining and drilling operations to move out 
into seabed regions well beyond the 200 meter depth line. This criterion 
whose counterpoint with that of depth was evident throughout the 
1950's also was enshrined in the Convention and the "exploitability test" 
thus came to be added to the definition of the continental shelf in 
Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention. Thus th_e continental 
shelf came to two concurrent outer legal limits: the 200 meters 
bathymetric contour line, and beyond that line to whatever depth the 
shelf is exploitable. Thus the article came to read as follows: 
For the purpose of these articles, the term 'continental 
shelf' is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of 
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of 
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that 
point, to where the depth of superjacent waters admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to 
the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to 
the coasts of islands. 
There has been a great deal of debate as to what we mean by "admits 
of the exploitation" in that article. Is it simply an engineering test, so 
that "exploitability" merely means whatever is technologically 
exploitable? Or are economic parameters involved? That is, does 
exploitability include "profitability"? That, of course, is a kettle of fish 
no one, I hope, will be discussing today! Finally, should exploitability be 
limited by environmental considerations? Be that as it may, everyone 
felt quite secure until the middle 60's about the definition of the outer 
extent of the continental shelf, in terms of Article I of the Continental 
Shelf Convention. 
Since 1958 technological developments accelerated. First, oil drilling 
at considerably greater depths than 200 meters became both 
technologically and economically feasible. By 1968 we find the drills 
aboard the exploration ship Glomar Challenger boring through 10,000 
feet of water and another couple of thousand feet of soil and rock 
beneath that to somewhat around about 12,500 feet from the surface of 
the sea. In 1969 those landmarks of oil deposits, salt domes, were drilled 
in the deep ocean floor off the West African coast, between the West 
African coast and the Atlantic Ridge. In the meantime, people had come 
to talk about the problem of regulating the exploration and exploitation 
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of oil deposits beyond 200 meters. This began in 1965. By 1966 there 
were meetings, papers read, articles published and enterprises launched 
to take advantage of the new technological and economic 
breakthroughs. What impact do these developments have on 
"exploitability" as a test for determining the outer limits of the legal 
continental shelf? In commenting on Senator Pell's Senate Resolution 
33of1969 I proposed that the Resolution should: 
[c]ontain a pledge that no exploration or exploitation 
authorities will be espoused or licensed by states, or by any 
international organizations, at depths greater than the 
feasability of closing of blowouts. Nor should pipelines be 
permitted below ... depths [at which they may be rapidly 
repaired]. 
The pledge referred to in this quotation is, of course, a promise by 
states parties to the "Declaration of Legal Principles" which Senator 
Pell included in his Resolution, that they would promulgate the 
necessary domestic legislation to prohibit drilling wells and pipelines 
below the depths of rapid and complete repair. Indeed, while 
"exploitability" remains a test for determining the outer limits of the 
continental shelf, the technological capacity to control the consequences 
of drilling holes in the seabed, rather than the mere capability of 
inflicting them on the environment, should set both the outer limit of 
exploitations, and the meaning of "exploitability" as a criterion of the 
extent of coastal states' continental shelves under Article 1 of the 
Continental Shelf Convention. 
B. The Resources of the Abyssal Floor 
Another set of developments have helped the issue of drilling 
capabilities to precipitate the problem of devising regimes to govern the 
exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep-ocean 
floor. They include the present technological capacity to win manganese 
nodules from the deep ocean floor. Nodules are sedimentary 
concentrations of manganese, iron, copper, cobalt, tin and many other 
metals. They vary greatly in size and proportions of their constituent 
chemical compounds. Many of them, however, are sufficiently rich in 
copper and manganese to be on the threshold of becoming commercially 
feasible resources, contemporary commercial interests and the 
possibility of their being capable of competing with land-based copper 
and manganese resources in the immediate future. They may be won by 
sweeping or collecting the individual pieces from the deep ocean floor. 
They could become of very great value to the United States as land-
based minerals either become scarce or harder to obtain through na-
tional policies developed in countries from whose land territories 
those minerals have standardly been brought to the United States. 
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But contemporary interest is not only involved with ensuring a 
regulated mining system for the resources of the deep ocean floor as a 
means of preventing the dangers of a twentieth century analogy of the 
"Grab for Africa" or of the "Oklahoma Land Rush." There are manv 
collateral considerations. In the General Assembly, Chile's concern ove.r 
the deep ocean floor exploitations has almost nothing to do with a desire 
to protect any possible deposits off its own coast or to vindicate the 
progressive developments of international law. It has a great deal to do 
with how Kennicott Copper and Anaconda may be able to get a 
substitute for the resources they may have won previously in Chile and 
which have become nationalized. 
In addition to manganese nodules and submarine oil and sulphur 
resources, there are other resources which can be won from the deep 
ocean floor. There are many other resources of the beds of the oceans, 
for example the location there of stations engaged in the transformation 
of the energy which tides and waves generate into usable electric power, 
or the location on the seabed of recreational and even hospital 
establishments. Regarding this last point, Captain Jacques-Yves 
Cousteau's description of how cuts and bruises, which were almost 
impossible to be cured ashore in the Sudan, healed almost miraculousl:v 
in a few days in the seabed habitat of Conshelf II presents food for 
thought. This rapid healing might merely have resulted from a by-
product of special breathing gases and the high pressures of that 
habitat, or it may have been caused by some beneficial effects of 
environment that we know nothing about at present. Be that as it may, 
it is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest casualty hospitals and 
hospitals engaged in major surgery might be established on the seabed 
of continental shelf regions. These speculations underscore the 
multifariousness of the future uses of the oceans and of their resources. 
But for the moment I merely wish to touch on the ones of major popular 
interest. These are oil, sulphur, and manganese nodules. 
III. ALTERNATIVE REGIMES OF THE SEABED 
The really crystalizing event, I think it's true to say, of concern about 
regimes from the seabed was Ambassador Pardo's speech introducing 
his resolution into the United Nations General Assembly. Ambassador 
Pardo, very interestingly, was the representative of a small country. 
But his speech was not derived from a desire to establish Malta as an 
important constituency for the seabed. Rather, his purpose appeared to 
be one of giving, in world affairs, a new kind of leadership which a small 
country is able to offer, that is, a moral leadership, a leadership in 
ideas, which has nothing in common with the traditional basis of 
leadership in international relations. This is a very important new 
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development in the significance of smaller states which results from the 
arms stalemate of the great powers, together with the function of the 
United Nations General Assembly as a town hall for the world. Indeed, 
the Great Powers' present confrontation in a posture of catatonic stasis 
underscores the lack of a capacity to lead in the realms of creative 
thought. Hence Ambassador Pardo should be recognized as a pioneer 
diplomat who was prepared to stake his career on an idea which had 
very little material advantage directly to himself or his country, except, 
of course, the honor of being its main draftsman and advocate. 
Following Ambassador Pardo's speech, various theories of regimes 
for the deep ocean floor developed. Many proposals reflected self-
interest on the part of various groups of states. Every theory that has 
been advanced in the General Assembly has also had a thorough airing 
in the academic debates, publications and lecture halls of the United 
States' educational and scientific estate and analysis by the 
technostructure. Thus I know of no doctrine that has been espoused by 
any country in the General Assembly, or in the former Ad Hoc 
Committee or in the present Deep Sea Committee, which has not, either 
previously, or concurrently, had its economically motivated or its 
theoretically and academically oriented supporters within the United 
States. There is one and possibly only one exception -namely the 
proposal of the National Petroleum Council. What are issues upon 
which all these theories turn? Briefly, the various blueprints for 
alternative regimes revolve around certain common considerations. 
These include: 
1. The scope of authority to be enjoyed by an international agency in 
making allocations of seabed areas, the means of obtaining revenues 
from exploitations of seabed areas and the distribution of the surplus of 
revenues over and above the actual cost of administration; 
2. The legal bases for the rights of states and enterprises to exploit 
the seabed, i.e., should they be governed by "first-come-first served" 
nations, or by some concern for distributive equities? 
3. The titles of states and enterprises to the resources they have 
severed from the seabed and its subsoil; 
4. The power of an international agency administering the regime to 
levy revenues over and above the costs of administration, and the 
destination of any "surplus" revenue; 
5. The impact of military uses of the seabed on winning minerals 
therefrom; 
6. The outer limits of the continental shelf. Where does it end and the 
international regime begin? There have been a great many proposals on 
this issue, but it seems to me that they all divide into two main groups, 
the so-called "narrow shelfers," which has the largest support in the 
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lecture halls and seminar rooms of the universities of the United States. 
and the "wide shelfers." There is also a third position which is, in real it~·. 
a compromise "narrow shelf' theory. The narrow shelfers all argue that 
the exploitabilit>· test of the Continental Shelf Doctrine should be 
rescinded by the parties to the Convention so that there will be a 
general agreement that the continental shelf ends at 200 meters. It is 
then hoped that a widespread practice and consent on this point ma>· 
make customary international law and so bind non parties to the 
Convention. Having come this far, the narrow-shelfers then divide. 
IV. NARROW vs. WIDE SHELFERS 
A. The Debate 
The narrow-shelfers argue that the whole jurisdiction and control 
seaward of the 200 meters bathymetric contour line should be vested in 
the international agency which then may grant limited rights of 
exploration and exploitation over specified and determined regions for 
fixed periods of time to states and/ or enterprises. The advocates of this 
position argue that states should give up whatever expectations of 
extended continental shelves beyond the 200 meter bath~·metric contour 
line the~· might have under the exploitability test. They tend to divide, 
however, with respect to coastal states' rights over submarine regions 
beyond that isobath which have alread>· fallen under coastal states' 
exclusive competences on the basis of their present exploitation. Some 
argue that these should continue to fall within the continental shelf 
patrimony of coastal states on the basis of a "grandfather clause" type 
of equity. Others argue that coastal states should deli\·er up such 
regions and render the international agency an accounting for an>· 
revenues obtained from working those zones. The only "grandfather 
clause" type of equity, these writers argue, should be the according of a 
right of compensation to the enterprise which exploited the region so 
passing from the competence of the coastal state to that of the 
international agency, should the international agenc>· decide to 
terminate the enterprise's activities. 
Some of the most articulate of the "wide shelfers" seek to place their 
argument on a foundation of geology and oceanography as well as upon 
the exploitability test in Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention. 
Theirs is an elaborate formulation. The geological argument is based on 
statements attributed to Dr. Pecora of the United States Geological 
Survey to the effect that at the "rise" of the continental pedestal, 
namely the slopes beyond the pedestal's foot or toe, there is a marked 
change of structure between the continental mass and the crust of the 
deep ocean basin. At this rise the geological nature of the seabed 
changes from being solel_y maritime, constituted by the special muds of 
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the deep sea floor, into the rocks and the geological structure of th e 
continental pedestal upon which the continental land mass itself stands . 
This is where the geological change takes place. The group of wide 
shelfers who rely on Dr. Pecora and Article 1 of the Continental Shelf 
Convention then argue that if the whole of the continental slopes, and 
indeed the abyssal plains are not now exploitable, they shortly will be. 
Accordingly , the exploitability test, without the limiting effect of th e 
term "adjacent" in Article 1 would allow the whole seabed including th e 
abyssal plains, to be brought within the sovereign rights of coastal 
states. The effect of the term "adjacent" is to bring, here and now, th e 
whole of the continental pedestal, right out to the rise and beyond th e 
toe of the pedestal, within states' legal continental shelves. 
We should note that this piece of advocacy also engages in some 
sleight-of-hand with the concept of the continental shelf. The whol e 
pedestal, shelf, slopes, margin, toe, and rise-is now subsumed under 
the name of the section which, correctly speaking, merely ~ndicates the 
"shoulder" of the total formation. The second misleading use of words 
in this argument is that of appraising an interest which is contingent on 
future events (namely future exploitations) upon the basis of the 
supposed certainty of those events occurring, rather than upon their 
present contingent nature. This attitude is reminiscent of those 
storybook remaindermen who see in contingent gifts to them an 
immediately accessible entry to fortune. The third fallacy is the 
acceptance, as a hard and fast description of the whole seabed capable 
of providing the prescriptive groundwork of legal proposition. 
While the lawyers who argue for the continental rise as representing 
the terminal line of demarcation of the continental shelf put forward 
Dr. Pecora's work as an unquestioned and objective fact, we find many 
discrepancies between it and other influential rulings. See, for example, 
the Report of the United Nations Secretary General to the Economic 
and Social Council on the Resources of the Sea, Part One: Mineral 
Resources of the Sea Beyond the Shelf, U.N. Document El 4409/ Add. 1 
(mimeo. 19 February 1968). The third, and most obvious, relates the 
impossibility at such depths as that of the rise, of determining the 
boundaries between adjacent states' continental shelves in regions 
where there are man;\' states and many different ways of drawing 
demarcation lines. In short, the wide shelf ers' position seems as 
reminiscent of a territorial imperative as the presentation of a valid and 
workable legal doctrine. 
B. A Compromise: The Intermediate Zone or "Trusteeship Area" 
The third, the compromise, position proposes that coastal states' 
continental shelf regions should extend out to the 200 meter isobath, but 
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no further; and that the seabed and subsoil regions between that 
bathymetric contour line and the continental rise should be 
administered, in terms of a trusteeship, by coastal states on behalf of 
the international community and answerable to the international 
agency. In particular, the coastal state would copy the authority of 
licensing seabed mining activities in the trusteeship area, but that area, 
by reason of this fact, would not be permitted to fall under the coastal 
states' continental shelf regimes. I have pointed out in a number of 
published pieces that, despite the attractiveness of this proposal of an. 
intermediate or trusteeship zone as a compromise between the wide-
shelf and the narrow-shelf parties, it has some fatal flaws. First, in 
practice there might well develop contests between coastal states and 
the international regime as to the modalities of control. Whereas 
mining activities in the zone would be regulated by the international 
authority, coastal states might demand a further say in what goes on in 
the trusteeship zones fronting onto their continental shelves, especially 
as this may well lead to the control of many other activities in the zone, 
the conduct of some of which might be compatible with mining, thus 
leading to a need for administrative and even, perhaps, juridical 
adjustments. In addition, if coastal states were to have a voice in the 
granting of mineral exploration and exploitation licenses, then they 
would be in a position to impose conditions upon the issuance of those 
licenses. If, further, the coastal' states' demands for a dominating 
position became intense, the conditions they stipulated for the licenses 
might well become of greater practical importance than the 
international regime's regulations. This latter authority might, indeed, 
subside into a residual, revenue-collecting regulatory agency. The 
chances of this becoming an eventuality are enhanced when one recalls 
how contemporary events in maritime law and policy reflect the greater 
pressure and authority of exclusive state claims over international 
claims and the continued assertion of the former at the expense of the 
latter. 
Since it is conceived of as a compromise, the trusteeship zone may, in 
effect, be merely a temporizing and temporary legal institution ready 
and poised to be merged into whichever of the two adjoining regimes 
(the coastal state's continental shelf regime or the international deep-
ocean regime) comes to exercise the stronger attraction. Hence, the 
proposal may turn out to be no more than a compromise of the moment. 
C. "Cutting One's Coat According to One's C'loth" 
In place of the trusteeship zone tout court, I have suggested that a 
variety of regimes might be appropriate for seabed zones with the same 
outer geographical boundaries and dimensions as those proposed for the 
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outer limits of the continental shelf by the wide shelf party and having 
an inner limit at the 200 meter isobath. Such a variety might be more 
feasibly tailored to local needs, due to the political geography and 
community histories of different offshore areas in many parts of the 
world, than a single type of regime would be. 
The geographical areas of such zones off, for example, the greater 
part of Australia (except, perhaps, under the Arafura Sea), Canada 
(with the exception of where that country's coastal boundaries join with 
those of Denmark, France and the United States), the Soviet Union 
(with similar exceptions, in principle, to those indicated for Australia 
and Canada), or the United States (again, with reciprocal exceptions 
similar to those just indicated for Canada, and, further, bearing in mind 
possible Mexican and Caribbean countries' equities) might well be 
absorbed into those countries' exclusive continental shelves. But, off the 
Caribbean submarine slopes of Central America or in the northern 
continental borderlands and slopes of the North Sea bed, for example, 
political and economic factors would militate against individual 
countries' gaining exclusive rights over "broad shelves." In such 
regions, submarine areas beyond the "narrow" continental shelf 
should be regulated by means of a managerial regime of concilia-
tion and/ or cooperation established by all the states of the region. 
Finally, in other areas (for example, perhaps, off West Africa, east of 
the Strait of Hormuz or off the Horn of Africa), where the facts of 
political and physical geography should, ceteris paribus, lend the 
offshore zones beyond the 200-meter bathymetric contour line to the 
regional managerial blueprint, but where local internal political 
instability, territorial rivalries, irredentism and long-lived hatreds 
preclude the formation of such a regime, the zones should be 
administered under the international regime to be established to 
regulate the resources of the deep-ocean bed. Such a takeover should not 
be accomplished, however, until a local regime of managerial 
cooperation had been tried and had been proved to have failed beyond 
redemption. Furthermore, it should be conducted as a trust for the 
countries of that region (as a group) which have been unable to combine 
effectively to administer the submarine areas in terms of a regime of 
administrative or managerial conciliation. 
A friendly criticism made to this writer questioned whether this 
more complex proposal would be politically marketable in the present 
state of the world. Would it be acceptable to developing countries? At 
first blush it would seem unduly to favor the "have" countries. 
Different as are the various proposals which have just been made for 
regimes governing the offshore zones between the 200 meter contour 
and the continental rise of states of continental or sub-continental 
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dimensions, they would all appear to give those coastal nations greater 
or more valuable or more exclusive rights than would the proposals for 
the offshore zones of middle-sized or smaller states. A persuasive reply 
would point out, in the first place, that small states would not get much 
under the standard compromise proposals of trusteeship zones either, 
and land-locked states would get nothing. In fact, both of these classes 
of states would gain more from a managerial regime than from the 
current proposals. Indeed, these proposals seem more likely to provide 
smaller states occupying regions of indented coastlines with the 
opportunities of engaging in boundary disputes than with rights of 
peacefully enjoying offshore resources. 
Secondly, it could be pointed out that, under these proposals, not only 
"have" countries would enjoy valuable increments to their offshore 
resources, but also a number of large and medium-sized "have-not" 
states, for example Nigeria, Brazil, India, Argentina, the Federation of 
Malaysia, and Indonesia, would qualify to gain the addition of whatever 
increments to their continental shelves could be agreed upon. 
Thirdly, these proposals can be supported by the argument that they 
provide an added initiative to "Balkanized" regions of the world to 
federate and so become more stable factors in international politics. 
One example will suffice: Concern about a possible failure of these 
proposals to make adequate provisions for the Central American States 
would not be so pressing if they were to federate, or if the Republic of 
Grand Colombia could be re-established. In brief, this blueprint may 
assist in inhibiting "Balkanization" and even reverse the trend. This 
same argument can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to many other 
Balkanized regions. 
Finally, these proposals are intended to bestow the advantages of 
federation upon the regulation of exploring and exploiting the seabed 
and subsoil resources of offshore zones beyond the two hundred meter 
isobath when the coastal states are in no mood to federate. A 
managerial regime is also a supranational authority. As such it may 
offer the means of removing some of the more deleterious results of 
disunity in a region from the administration of offshore resources 
beyond the two hundred meter isobath. A further advantage is that the 
land-locked states of the region could also participate in, and benefit 
from, the regime, whereas they are inevitably excluded from 
participating in the fruits of the standard proposals of trusteeship 
zones. 
V. IDEOLOGIES AND THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE-A DISCOVERY! 
Although I have discussed the blueprints which have been put 
forward and received a following in terms of theoretical criteria, we 
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should not forget that their basic viability stems from the fact that they 
are championed by states. Unless they have been so championed there is 
little hope for their practical implementation. It is of interest, therefore, 
to note that the states of the world have as diverse concepts of their own 
separate interests, or of the inclusive interests of the world community, 
as may be in any university seminar room or lecture hall. 
The differences between states tend to reflect their differences 
regarding the politics and economics of the distribution of the seas' 
resources. They point up that juxtaposition of poor and rich countries, 
the north and south countries, which further complicate the politics of 
the problems of future exploitation of the ocean's resources. 
We should note, with great interest, that the most conservative 
country with a powerful stake in the exploitation of all the oceans' 
resources is the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Soviet's stance on the 
distribution of the resources of the high seas more closely resembles 
those of nineteenth century industrial tycoons than one might expect. 
"Every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost," said the 
elephant as he danced among the chickens. The most concerned 
countries, those who advocate that there are extensive economic 
possibilities for the winning of resources whose revenue should be 
sharable among the peoples of the world, propose that the resources of 
the seabed should be held, in Ambassador Pardo's ringing phrase "the 
common heritage of mankind." But we should not see the present 
debate as only involving the claims of laissez faire versus regulation and 
welfare. There are other dimensions. Some states have an interest in 
diverting expected exploration activities from the seabed to their own 
untapped resources. There are others again who see in the maritime 
exploitation of minerals competition for the exports on which they 
depend. There is concern that they are not going to be beaten in the 
market place by the smelting of nodules. 
In conclusion I must point out a surprising fact. In an age where a 
great many political ideologies are brandished about on dry land, they 
have not provided the reference points or the theoretical framework for 
any proposals for seabed regimes. No dogmatics have appeared to 
resolve the problems of formulating the true seabed regime. Nor have 
any publicists established the necessary logical relation between what a 
state may propose and the terms of the national ideology, as distinct 
from the interests as determined by pragmatic criteria. This may be 
due either to a sensible and worldwide resort to pragmatism (which 
comes closest to making universal our own American way of operating), 
or it may be due to the fact that more and more people are getting tired 
of ideologies and want to see a more rational ordering of the world 
community in the light of humanistic values and goals. 
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It is to be very greatly regretted that little has been said, in 
connection with our topic for today, by publicists and states on behalf of 
the environment and of the amenities of life which the wholesale 
exploitation of the seabed's resources may threaten. I shall reserve my 
own comments on this vital matter, together with my strong 
expressions of. disappointment with writers and diplomats alike, for a 
later section of this Regional Meeting. 
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